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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Damon Marcelino Lopez appeals from denial, following an evidentiary 
hearing, of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that the district 
court erred by denying his petition for post-conviction relief and that the Idaho Supreme 
Court violated his right to counsel by allowing his appellate attorney to withdraw. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The factual background and procedural history of this case, as related by the 
district court, are as follows: 
On December 3, 2009, the Petitioner was charged by Superceding 
[sic] Indictment with Sexual Battery of a Minor Child Sixteen or Seventeen 
Years, a felony, a violation of Idaho Code 18-1508A. Lopez was charged 
by Part II Superceding [sic] Indictment with Persistent Violator, pursuant to 
Idaho Code 19-2514. On April 23, 2010, Lopez entered a plea of guilty to 
the Sexual Battery offense and the Persistent Violator charge was 
dismissed. On May 11, 2010, Lopez's attorney Marco DeAngelo filed a 
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel and the court entered the Order Allowing 
Attorney to Withdraw on May 14, 2010. Lopez was appointed a Public 
Defender at that time. A sentencing hearing was scheduled for July 12, 
2010 which was held but sentencing was continued to the following day to 
allow the defendant additional time to review and consider the information 
in the Pre-Sentence Investigation and related evaluations. Sentencing 
was held on July 13, 2010. The Judgment and Commitment was filed on 
July 22, 2010. The defendant was sentenced by this court to a total 
unified sentence of twenty-eight (28) years consisting of a fixed sentence 
of seven (7) years followed by an indeterminate sentence of twenty-one 
(21) years. That sentence was ordered to be run concurrently with 
Lopez's parole violation. He was granted credit for two hundred thirty-two 
(232) days. 
On September 16, 2010, the defendant filed a pro se Motion for 
Correction or Reduction of Sentence, ICR 35. On September 22, 2010, 
the court issued an Order Appointing Attorney. The State filed an 
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Objection on October 1, 2010. On February 8, 2011, the court heard oral 
argument on the Rule 35 motion. Lopez was present and represented by 
Alexa Perkins, Canyon County Public Defender. The Order Denying 
Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to !.C.R. 35 was filed on 
March 25, 2011. The court, having reviewed the criminal file and ISTARS, 
does not find that Lopez appealed any of the decisions of this court prior 
to filing his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
(R., p.141-42.) 
Lopez filed a petition for post-conviction reiief, alleging that his various attorneys 
were ineffective for not spending adequate time with him to prepare his case or discuss 
viable defenses, not informing him in regards to his Estrada 1 rights, and not obtaining 
favorable information for sentencing. (R., pp.3-9; 50-53.) The district court ultimately 
held an evidentiary hearing on the petition. (R., pp.116-20.) The district court also gave 
the parties the opportunity to submit closing memoranda. (R., pp.121-28.) The district 
court determined that Lopez failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel and so denied his petition for post-conviction 
relief. (R., pp.140-62.) 
Lopez filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.164-67.) Lopez also requested and 
was appointed appellate counsel through the State Appellate Public Defender. (R., 
pp.168-70). After reviewing the record and determining that there was no viable issue 
to appeal, appointed counsel moved to withdraw. (Motion for Leave to Withdraw and to 
Suspend the Briefing Schedule, filed September 26, 2013 (hereinafter "Motion")). The 
Idaho Supreme Court granted the motion to withdraw. (Order Granting Motion for 
Leave to VVithdraw and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, filed October 22, 2013 
(hereinafter "Order").) 




Did The District Court Err When It Dismissed The Petition Post 
Conviction Relief? 
Has The Appellant Been Denied Due Process Of Law By The Court 
Ordering That He Had No Right To Counsel During A Critical Stage Of 
The Proceedings? 
Has The Appellant Been Denied His Right To The Effective Assistance Of 
Counsel? 
Has The Appellant Been Denied His Right To Have The Assistance Of 
Counsel To Bring Forward This Appeal? 
(Appellant's brief, p.11.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Lopez failed to show that he has a right to counsel to pursue a frivolous 
appeal from the denial of a post-conviction petition? 
2. Has Lopez failed to show error in the denial, following an evidentiary hearing, of 




The Idaho Supreme Court Did Not Violate Lopez's Right To Counsel By Allowing His 
Appellate Counsel To Withdraw 
A. Introduction 
Below, Lopez requested and was appointed counsel for his petition for post-
conviction relief. (R., pp.10-13, 19-20.) Following an evidentiary hearing, the district 
court denied Lopez's post-conviction petition (R., pp.140-62) and Lopez appealed (R., 
pp.164-67). Lopez requested and was appointed appellate counsel. (R., pp.168-70.) 
However, after reviewing the record and determining that there was no viable issue to 
appeal, appointed counsel moved to withdraw. (Motion.) The Idaho Supreme Court 
granted the motion to withdraw. (Order.) On appeal, Lopez argues that the Idaho 
Supreme Court violated his constitutional right to counsel. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-12.) 
Application of the correct legal standards, however, demonstrates that Lopez has failed 
to establish a violation of his constitutional rights. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one of 
deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of 
whether constitutiona, requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State 
v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135 
Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
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If This Case Is Assigned To The Idaho Court Of Appeals. Lopez Has Failed To 
Provide Any Basis For The Court To Reconsider The Idaho Supreme Court's 
Order Granting Counsel's Motion To Withdraw 
In State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 288 P.3d 835 (Ct. App. 2012), the Idaho 
Court of Appeals considered a claim that the Idaho Supreme Court denied the appellant 
his constitutional rights by denying a motion made prior to assignment of the case. In 
doing so, the Court "disclaim[edJ any authority to review, and, in effect, reverse an Idaho 
Supreme Court decision made on a motion made prior to assignment of the case to [the 
Idaho Court of Appeals] on the ground that the Supreme Court decision was contrary to 
the state or federal constitutions or other law." llic. at 620, 288 P.3d at 837. Such an 
undertaking, the Court explained, "would be tantamount to the Court of Appeals 
entertaining an 'appeal' from an Idaho Supreme Court decision and is plainly beyond 
the purview of this Court." llic. In the event that this case is assigned to the Court of 
Appeals, Lopez's arguments fail to provide any basis for the Court to reconsider the 
Idaho Supreme Court's order allowing appellate counsel to withdraw. 
D. Even On The Merits, Lopez Has Failed To Show Any Entitlement To Counsel On 
This Appeal 
Even if this Court considers the merits of Lopez's claim, his assertion still fails. 
There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in post-conviction proceedings, 
whether in the trial court or on appeal. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 
(1987) (the right to counsel extends only to criminal trial proceedings, the defendant's 
"first appeal as of right, and no further"). Contrary to Lopez's arguments, therefore, the 
Idaho Supreme Court did not violate his constitutional rights by allowing his appellate 
counsel to withdraw. 
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Indigent petitioners are accorded a statutory right 
to be represented in any other post-conviction or post-commitment 
proceeding that the attorney or the needy person considers appropriate, 
unless the court in which the proceeding is brought determines that it is 
not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means would be 
willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a frivolous proceeding. 
LC. § 19-852(b)(3). In requesting to withdraw, Lopez's appointed appellate counsel 
explained that aftei reviewing the appellate record, counsel was unable to find a single 
viable issue to appeal. (Memorandum in Support of Motion, pp.4-6.) The Idaho 
Supreme Court implicitly agreed with appellate counsel that Lopez's appeal was 
frivolous when it granted counsel's motion to withdraw. (Order.) For the reasons set 
forth below in section II, Lopez's appeal is without merit and the Supreme Court 
correctly granted appellate counsel's motion. 
There is no constitutional right to counsel; therefore, contrary to his claims on 
appeal, Lopez was not deprived of his constitutional right to counsel. Lopez was also 
not deprived of his statutory right to counsel because his appeal from the denial, after 
an evidentiary hearing, of his petition for post-conviction relief is frivolous. Lopez has 
failed to show that his right to counsel was violated. 
11. 
Lopez Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial, After An Evidentiary 
Hearing, Of His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court determined that Lopez failed to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel and so denied his petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.140-60.) On 
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appeal, Lopez contends that he proved ineffective assistance of counsel and so should 
have been granted post-conviction relief. (Appellant's brief, pp.2-10.) Application of the 
correct legal standards to Lopez's claim, however, shows that he failed to prove that his 
attorneys were ineffective. The district court therefore properly denied Lopez's petition 
for post-conviction relief. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Because proceedings under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act are civil, where 
there is competent and substantial evidence to support a decision made after an 
evidentiary hearing on an application for post-conviction relief, that decision will not be 
disturbed on appeal. Odom v. State, 121 Idaho 625, 826 P.2d 1337 (Ct. App. 1992). 
C. The District Court Correctly Denied Lopez's Post-Conviction Petition 
A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which the claim is based. I.C.R. 
57(c); McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010). At an evidentiary 
hearing, the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters within the province of the trial 
court. Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 440 (Ct. App. 1988). The 
district court's factual findings will not be disturbed if "supported by substantial, even if 
conflicting, evidence in the record." Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844, 846, 875 P.2d 
941, 943 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312, 658 P.2d 983 (1983)). 
On review of an order denying post-conviction relief, the lower court's decision that the 
burden of proof has not been met is entitled to great weight, and a finding that a party 
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has failed to prove his c!aim will not be set aside unless that finding is clearly erroneous. 
Larkin, 115 Idaho at 7 4, 764 P .2d at 441. 
Lopez asserted in his petitions that his attorneys were ineffective, alleging that 
they were inadequately prepared, failed to inform him of his Estrada rights, and failed to 
obtain favorable information for sentencing. (R., p.5, 50-53.) \/\/here the petitioner 
alleges entitlement to relief based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show 
that his attorney's performance was objectively deficient and that he was prejudiced by 
that deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Aragon v. 
State, 114 Idaho 758, 760-61, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1988). To show deficient 
performance, the petitioner must "overcome the strong presumption that counsel's 
performance was adequate by demonstrating 'that counsel's representation did not 
meet objective standards of competence."' Vick v. State, 131 Idaho 121, 124, 952 P.2d 
1257, 1260 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 648-49, 873 P.2d 
898, 902-03 (Ct. App. 1994)). Appellate courts "will not second guess counsel without 
evidence of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other 
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466, 469-
470, 816 P.2d 1023, 1026-27 (Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted). When the alleged 
deficiency involves counsel's advice in relation to a guilty plea, "in order to satisfy the 
'prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 
on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (footnote and citations 
omitted). "Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the 
court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the 
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circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 
(citation omitted). 
130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) 
In its "Order Denying Petition for Post-Conviction Relief," the district court 
articulated the applicable legal standards, made detailed factual findings, and explained 
the reasons Lopez failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel. (See R., pp.140-60.) The state adopts as part of its 
argument on appeal the district court's reasoning for its denial, as set forth at pages 5-
21 of its order, a copy of which is attached hereto as "Appendix A." 
On appeal, Lopez also argues that his attorney was ineffective for failing to file an 
appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-7.) Though this issue does not appear to be included in 
Lopez's amended post-conviction petition, it was addressed during the evidentiary 
hearing and the district court discussed it in its order denying post-conviction relief. 
(Compare R., pp.50-53, with pp.157-60.) 
To establish an objective deficiency in the context of a claim that trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal, the petitioner must show either that 
(1) the attorney failed to follow his express instructions to file an appeal, or (2) the 
attorney failed to consult with him and (a) a rational defendant would want to appeal 
(based on nonfrivolous grounds), or (b) this particular defendant reasonably 
demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 
528 U.S. 470, 477-80 (2000). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate 
that, but for counsel's deficient conduct, he would have appealed. kl at 486. 
On appeal, Lopez abandons his original claim that his attorney failed to inform 
him of his right to appeal (see R., p.8) and instead argues that his attorney failed to 
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foiiow his express instructions to file an appeal (Appellant's brief, pp.4-7). The United 
States Supreme Court has explained: 
If counsel has consulted with the defendant, the question of deficient 
performance is easily answered: Counsel performs in a professionally 
unreasonable manner only by failing to follow the defendant's express 
instructions with respect to an appeal. 
Flores-Orteaa, 528 U.S. at 478. Lopez claims that he sent a letter to his attorney 
instructing him to file an appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-6.) Whether Lopez actually 
sent such a letter was disputed at the evidentiary hearing. (See Tr., p.29, L.19 - p.31, 
L.12.) Trial counsel did not recall receiving a letter from Lopez and there was no letter 
from Lopez in his file, which should have been the case if a letter was in fact received. 
(Tr., p.30, L.23 - p.31, L.12.) 
Lopez argues that because no one proved conclusively that he did not send a 
letter instructing his attorney to file an appeal, the district court erred by denying this 
claim. (Appellant's brief, p.6.) This misconstrues the burden of proof. Lopez had the 
burden to produce evidence to prove his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. 
See McKay, 148 Idaho at 570, 225 P.3d at 703. Lopez failed to carry this burden. At 
best, whether Lopez sent a letter was disputed, and the weighing of disputed evidence, 
and attendant credibility determinations, are the province of the trial court. Larkin, 115 
Idaho at 73, 764 P.2d at 440. After weighing the disputed evidence, the trial court 
determined that Lopez failed to prove that he sent a letter requesting his attorney to file 
an appeal. (R., pp.158-60.) 
The district court's determination that Lopez failed to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel is supported 
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by the evidence presented below. The district court's order denying Lopez's petition for 
post-conviction relief should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
denying Lopez's post-conviction petition. 
DATED this 21st day of March, 2014 
c~ RD~SPENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 21st day of March, 2014, served two true 
and correct copies of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by placing two copies in 
the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Damon Marcelino Lopez 
IDOC #58841 
ISCI 
PO Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
RJS/pm 
Deputy Attorney General 
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) Case No. CV-2011-5914-C 
) 
) 
) ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 





On June 16, 2011, the Petitioner Damon Marcelino Lopez (Lopez) filed a prose Petition 
and Affidavit for Post-Conviction Relief and a Brief in Support of Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief On June 21, 2011, this court issued an Order Appointing Public Defender. On July 22, 
2011, the State filed an Answer. On September 15, 2011, this court issued an Order Appointing 
Conflict Counsel. On November 11, 2011, the court issued an Order Extending Time to File 
Amended Petition. On November 14, 2011, an Amended Order Appointing Conflict Counsel 
was issued. A Second Amended Order Appointing Conflict Counsel was filed on December 6, 
2011. The Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and Second Affidavit in Support was 
filed on December 20, 2011. A Status Conference was held on April 9, 2012. A Pre-Trial 
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Conference was held on August 6, 2012. On August 30, 2012, the Petitioner filed a Motion for 
Judicial Notice. 
The Evidentiary Hearing was held on October 24, 2012. The Petitioner was present and 
represented by attorney Elizabeth Allen. The Petitioner called Marco DeAngelo, William 
Schwartz, and Rick Cedillo as witnesses. The Petitioner also testified on his own behalf. The 
State did not call any witnesses. The court did grant the Petitioner's request to take judicial 
notice pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 201. Following the hearing, the court allowed the 
parties additional time to submit written closing arguments. The Petitioner's Closing Argument 
was filed on November 27, 2012. The State's Response to Petitioner's Closing Argument was 
filed on December 3, 2012. 
Procedural History for Underlying Criminal Case CR-2009M38708 
On December 3, 2009, the Petitioner was charged by Superceding Indictment with Sexual 
Battery of a Minor Child Sixteen or Seventeen Years, a felony, a violation of Idaho Code 18-
1508A. Lopez was charged by Part II Superceding Indictment with Persistent Violator, pursuant 
to Idaho Code 19-2514. On April 23, 2010, Lopez entered a plea of guilty to the Sexual Battery 
offense and t.½.e Persistent Violator charge was dismissed. On May 11, 2010, Lopez's attorney 
Marco DeAngelo filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel and the court entered the Order 
Allowing Attorney to Withdraw on May 14, 2010. Lopez was appointed a Public Defender at 
that time. A sentencing hearing was scheduled for July 12, 2010 which was held but sentencing 
was continued to the following day to allow the defendant additional time to review and consider 
the information in the Pre-Sentence Investigation and related evaluations. Sentencing was held 
on July 13, 2010. The Judgment and Commitment was filed on July 22, 2010. The defendant 
was sentenced by this court to a total unified sentence of twenty-eight (28) years consisting of a 
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fixed sentence of seven (7) years followed by an indeterminate sentence of twenty-one (21) 
years. That sentence was ordered to be run concurrently with Lopez's parole violation. He was 
granted credit for two hundred thirty-two (232) days. 
On September 16, 2010, the defendant filed a prose Motion for Correction or Reduction 
of Sentence, ICR 35. On September 22, 2010, the court issued an Order Appointing Attorney. 
The State filed an Objection on October 1, 2010. On February 8, 2011, the court heard oral 
argument on the Rule 35 motion. Lopez was present and represented by Alexa Perkins, Canyon 
County Public Defender. The Order Denying Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to 
LC.R. 35 was filed on March 25, 2011. The court, having reviewed the criminal file and 
1ST ARS, does not find that Lopez appealed any of the decisions of this court prior to filing his 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
Standard of Review 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature. 
State v. Bearshield, I 04 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 
830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 
(Ct.App.1992). However, an application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an 
ordinary civil action. An application must contain much more than a "short and plain statement 
of the claim". It must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the 
applicant. Further, affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be 
attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included. LC. § 19-
4903. In other words, the application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence 
supporting the allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal. Id. An application for 
post-conviction relief may be filed at any time within one year from the expiration of the time for 
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appeal or from the determination of proceedings following an appeal. LC. § 19-4902. The court 
finds that Leonard's petition was timely filed. 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application for post-
conviction relief either pursuant to the motion of a party or upon t.1-ie court's own initiative. 
Summary dismissal is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. 
Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,684 (Ct. App. 1999). It is appropriate only when the applicant's 
evidence has raised no genuine issues of material fact that if resolved would entitle the applicant 
to relief. Id. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. 
Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763 (Ct. App. 1991). However if there is no material issue of 
fact the court can, on its own motion, dismiss without a hearing. I.C. § 19-4906(b). As noted 
above, the court denied the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal finding that there were issues 
of fact to be resolved at an evidentiary hearing. 
Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of evidence 
the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. LC.§ 19-4907; Russell 
v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67 (Ct. App. 1990). It is within the province of the trial court to evaluate 
the credibility of witness and the weight to be given to t.\eir testimony as well as to determine 
what inferences are to be drawn from the evidence before the court. Mendiola v. State, 150 
Idaho 345,247 P.3d 210 (Ct. App. 2010), review denied. 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
As noted above the Petitioner filed a pro se Petition. In that petition, Lopez asserts 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In the Amended Petition, Lopez again asserts the 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel claims. Specifically, he asserts that counsel did not spend 
ad.equate time with him to prepare for the case and to discuss possible defenses, did not infonn 

























hlm of his Fifth Amendment and Estrada rights related to the psychosexual evaluation, and 
failed to contact Probation and Parole to obtain favorable information about Lopez prior to 
sentencing. Lopez also asserts that his counsel did not infonn him of his right to appeal the 
decisions of this court. 
In an Ineffective Assistance of Counsel claim, a defendant must satisfy the two prong test 
that: 1) his counsePs performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and 2) 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the results of the proceedings 
would have been different. Stric!dand v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (I 984). The 
benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result. Id at 686. See State v. Charboneau, 116 Id.ilia 129, 137, cert 
denied, 493 U.S. 922 (1989); see also Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986); Paradis v. State, 
110 Idaho 534 (1986); Carter v. State, I 08 Idaho 788 (1985). To prevail on an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's performance was 
deficient, and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency. Jalwski v. State, 136 Id.ilia 
280, 284 (Ct. App. 2001). To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that 
the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 
114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988). To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable 
probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have 
been different. Id at 761. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that the strategic and tactical 
decisions made by trial counsel are not a basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
unless a showing can be made that such decisions arose out of a lack of preparation, ignorance of 
relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective review. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 
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355, _, 247 P.3d 582, 610 (2010). Because there is a strong presumption that an attorney's 
performance falls within ''the wide range of professional assistance" the burden is on the 
defendant to show a "reasonable probability" that a different result was likely and that prejudice 
resulted from counsel's actions. Id. "\\'hen a defendant has been convicted upon a plea of guilty, 
the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel1s errors, he or 
she would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial in order to satisfy the 
prejudice prong. Hoffman v. State, 277 P.3d 1050, 1054-55 (Idaho Ct. App. 2012). 
Preparation and Conduct of Trial Counsel 
The first claim asserted by the Petitioner is that his counsel did not spend an adequate 
amount of time with the Petitioner and that he was thus prejudiced. Petitioner does not identify 
which counsel this argument is directed to and the record of this case indicates that Lopez was 
represented by the Canyon County Public Defender's Office, then he was represented by Mr. 
DeAngelo, and then he was represented again by the Canyon Cou,_,ty Public Defender's Office. 
The only evidence admitted into the record relates to the actions of Mr. DeAngelo prior to and 
during the change of plea process and the actions of Mr. Schwartz as to the pre~sentence and 
sentencing process. 
Marco DeAngelo 
The court notes that on December 18, 2009 the court scheduled a criminal jury trial for 
April 27, 2010. As to Mr. DeAngelo, the record shows that a Pre-Trial Conference was held on 
April 5, 2010 and the court was informed. at that time that Lopez had hired Mr. DeAngelo to 
represent him in place of the Public Defender. Mr. DeAngelo was not present at that hearing due 
to a scheduling conflict so the court set a continued Pre-Trial Conference hearing for the 
following day. On April 6, 2010, Mr. DeAngelo appeared with Lopez, obtained the discovery 
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from the Public Defender, and participated in the preparation of the Pre-Trial Memorandum. Mr. 
DeAngelo testified that after receiving the discovery that day, he spent the afternoon and evening 
reviewing the discovery and all of the audio recordings. He testified that he probably spent ten 
(10) to twelve (12) hours doing this work. He then testified that he went to the Canyon County 
Jail on April 7, 2010 and spent about an hour with Lopez reviewing the case. He then testified 
that he went back to the jail on April 15, 2010 and spent about thirty (30) minutes with Lopez. 
Finally, he testified that on April 23, 2010, the day of the scheduled Status Conference, he went 
to court early in order to assist Lopez in completing the change of plea form required by the 
court. He testified that it was his belief that he spent between fifteen (15) to twenty (20) hours in 
total on Lopez's case. 
Mr. DeAngelo also testified that during this time frame he worked with the State in order 
to craft an acceptable plea agreement that Lopez would accept. Lopez did accept the plea 
agreement and did enter a plea of guilty after having consulted with DeAngelo. In addition, Mr. 
DeAngelo testified that he reviewed the discovery to determine if there were any viable pre-trial 
motions that would assist Lopez in his case and that he did not find the evidence to support the 
filing of any viable pre-trial motions. 
The court cannot find that Lopez has asserted a specific factual claim of prejudice based 
on the amount of time be spent with :Mr. DeAngelo during the time period in which Mr. 
DeAngelo was attorney of record. He makes general arguments that he was unable to discuss 
alternative defenses and or mitigation, however, he does not provide any specific evidence that 
there were viable defenses and/or evidence of mitigation that might have assisted Mr. DeAngelo 
in his plea negotiations with the State. In addition, the court notes that Lopez waited over four 
months to hire Mr. DeAngelo and did so only two weeks before the scheduled jury trial. Based 















on Mr. DeAnge!o' s testimony, which is not contradicted on the record by Lopez, it appears to 
th.is court that Mr. DeAngelo was diligent in reviewing the discovery and facts of Lopez's case 
and met with him to review that information, and again after receiving a plea offer from the 
State. The court does not take lightly the fact that Lopez waited until what could be considered 
the last minute to hire an attorney to represent him. The record supports the finding that Mr. 
DeAngelo acted professionally and adequately represented Lopez during Lhe time that he 
represented him. Finally, the court notes that at the change of plea hearing held on April 23, 
20 I 0, the court specifically and directly asked Lopez "Have you had sufficient time to review 
this matter with your attorney, Mr. DeAngelo?" to which Lopez responded "Yes, I have, Your 
Honor." (April 23, 2010 transcript, page 7, ll. 18-20). The court gave Lopez the opportunity to 
express his concerns about the amount of time at the change of plea hearing and was told directly 
by Lopez that he had adequate time with Mr. DeAngelo to discuss the plea agreement and 
change of plea proceedings. 
Therefore the court finds that Lopez has failed to show, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that Mr. DeAngelo was ineffective based on the amoUt'1t of time he spent with Lopez 
during the approximately five weeks that Mr. DeAngelo acted as Lopez's defense attorney. In 
addition, the court finds that Lopez has failed to show any prejudice suffered as a result of bis 
representation by Mr. DeAngelo in the criminal case. 
William Schwartz 
The court notes that the Petitioner does not appear to take issue with any actions taken by 
Mr. Schwartz prior to the time that the Canyon County Public Defender's office was re-
appointed after Mr. DeAngleo withdrew from the action. Therefore, the court will focus its 
comments as to the conduct of Mr. Schwartz prior to and at the time of the sentencing hearing. 
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The Petitioner asserts that Mr. Schwartz did not spend adequate time preparing for the 
sentencing hearing and therefore, did not present all information at the time of sentencing. He 
testified that he spent only about a half an hour with :tvfr. Schwartz to review the information to 
be presented at sentencing and that he did not feel that Mr. Schwartz gave him an adequate 
opportunity to ask questions and to request that certain information be presented at sentencing. 
Petitioner's Estrada arguments will be addressed below. 
Mr. Schwartz testified that his normal procedure is to wait to prepare for sentencing until 
he has received all the evaluations and reports, and then he would review those and ensure that 
the defendant received a copy. He then testified that he would make an appointment with the 
defendant, or go to the jail to consult with the defendant about the information after the 
defendant had an opportunity to review the relevant documents. He further testified that when he 
met with a defendant to review the sentencing documents and procedures that he would review 
the pre~sentence investigation report along with any evaluations with the defendant and then he 
would discuss with the defend.ant the court's procedures as well as appellate and Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35 rights and timelines. 
In addition, the Petitioner asserts that Mr. Schwartz did not have Lopez's probation 
officer Rick Cedillo testify at the sentencing hearing on Lopez's behalf and that the court was not 
presented with the argument that Lopez should be considered eligible for rehabilitation as 
opposed to incarceration. Lopez testified that he sent :tvfr. Schwartz a letter requesting that Mr. 
Cedillo be contacted to testify at the sentencing hearing andlor write a progress report regarding 
Lopez's conduct on probation. Mr. Schwartz testified that he did not independently recall being 
requested to call Mr. Cedillo as a witness but agreed that he did not call Mr.Cedillo as a witness 
at the sentencing hearing. Mr. Schwartz testified that he has, at times, submitted to a client's 
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request to call a particular witness at a sentencing hearing but the decision to do so would be 
based on his professional opinion as to the appropriateness of doing so. He testified, as to 
Lopez's case, that even if he had been asked to call Mr. Cedillo as a wimess, he probably would 
not have done so because it is unlikely that a probation/parole officer would be able to provide 
information to the court that would be beneficial to the defendant during sentencing and that the 
probation officer's input would more likely be relevant to the pre-sentence investigation stage of 
the criminal case. Mr. Cedillo testified that if he had been subpoenaed to the sentencing hearing 
that he would have testified, however, he stated that the extent of his testimony likely would 
have been limited to the opinion that Lopez had been complying with probation requirements 
and faat there were no "red flags" prior to the filing of the charge at issue in the underlying 
criminal case. 
The sentencing hearing was originally scheduled for July 12, 2010, however, at that 
hearing Lopez expressed some concerns to the court about his Estrada rights and the evaluation 
process. The court then continued the sentencing hearing in order to allow Lopez additional time 
to meet with Mr. Schwartz in order to address those issues. On July 13, 2010, when the parties 
reconvened for sentencing the court engaged in the following conversation with Lopez: 
Court: I want to make sure, have you now had sufficient time to review the presentence 
investigation report with the attachments, including the GAIN assessment, the 
psychosexual report, psychosexual evaluation, and discussed them with your attorney, 
Mr. Schwartz? 
Lopez: Yes I have, Your Honor. 
Court: So you 're ready to proceed today, sir? 
Lopez: Yes, Your Honor. 
Court: I see the wince in your face. 
Lopez: It's just hard to have to go through this. That's all 
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than that you're 
Court: --you feel that you've had adequate opportunity to access your lawyer, discuss the 
matter with your lawyer and prepare for sentencing? 
Lopez: Yes, Your Honor. 
Court: Is that correct, sir? 
Lopez: Yes, that is correct. 
(Transcript, July 13,2010, page 2, 11. 23-35, page 3, II. 1 -21). 
Guided by the rule of law that a court will not second guess the tactical or strategic 
decisions of trial counsel "unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance 
of relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation", the court does not find 
that the actions of Mr. Schwartz constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Pentico, 
151 Idaho 906, 914, 265 P.3d 519, 527 (Ct. App. 2011), review denied. Mr. Schwartz was 
assigned to this court for a number of years and the court is very familiar with the 
professionalism and typical procedures of Mr. Schwartz during a criminal sentencing. The court 
accepts Mr. Schwartz's testimony that he prepared for Lopez's sentencing in the typical manner, 
that is by reviewing all the information and then meeting with Lopez to discuss the same and that 
spent an adequate amount of time doing so. In addition, the court finds that even if Lopez is 
correct that Mr. Schwartz did not spend an adequate time preparing prior to the July 12, 20 I 0 
hearing, that the court allowed them both additional time to meet, to discuss the issues, and to 
come back to court prepared for sentencing the following day. In addition, the court finds that 
other than the argument that Mr. Schwartz did not call Mr. Cedillo as a witness, Lopez has not 
made a specific factual allegation that he was prejudiced by the alleged lack of preparation by 
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Mr. Schwartz. Therefore, the court finds that even if it was to determine that Mr. Schwartz did 
not spend an adequate amount of time preparing for the sentencing hearing, Lopez has failed to 
specify any specific prejudice suffered and the court finds that any prejudice would be 
outweighed by the fact that the court allowed Lopez and Mr. Schwartz additional time to meet 
and discuss the sentencing issues. Finally, the court notes that he allowed Lopez the opportunity 
at the sentencing hearing to express any additional concerns he might have prior to the court 
proceeding with sentencing and Lopez failed to so inform the court as shown by the above 
quoted portion of th.e sentencing hearing. 
The court also finds that Lopez has failed to specifically identify the prejudice he suffered 
by the fact that Mr. Cedillo was not called as a witness at the sentencing hea..ring. First, Lopez 
has not provided the court with any evidence that he did inform Mr. Schwartz that he wanted :Mr. 
Cedillo to appear as a witness. However, even if he had asked for such consideration, the court 
finds the testimony of M..r. Schwartz to be credible and will not second guess bis determination 
that calling Mr. Cedillo would not have been beneficial or have an impact on this court's 
sentencing determination. While Lopez would like this court, in hindsight, to determine that the 
testimony of Mr. Cedillo might have presented testimony that Lopez was amenable to probation 
and/or other treatment, Lopez fails to account for the fact that this court carefully considered 
Lopez's criminal history, the specifics of the offense charged, as well as all the information 
provided in the various evaluations prepared for the court's consideration. As thls court noted at 
the time of sentencing, and in ruling on the I.C.R. 35 motion, the court considered all relevant 
information and determined that the sentence imposed was proper given all the information and 
the offense for which Lopez was being sentenced. Therefore, the court finds that the decision 
not to call Mr. Cedillo as a witness was a strategic decision on the part of Mr. Schwartz and will 
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not be second guessed by this court. In addition, the court finds that Lopez has failed to specify 
any prejudice suffered in light of all the other information and argument presented to the court at 
the time of sentencing. 
Therefore, the court denied Lopez's request for post-conviction relief due to a lack of 
preparation on the part of Mr. DeAngelo and Mr. Schwartz as identified above. 
Estrada Issues 
In his petitions for post-conviction relief, Lopez makes general arguments that bis 
counsel was ineffective because Lopez was not properly informed as to his Estrada rights and 
Lopez was prejudiced because he implicated himself during the psychosexual evaluation that 
was prepared in anticipation of sentencing. Lopez does not specify whether these arguments are 
directed at Mr. DeAngelo or :t\1r. Schwartz and thus because Lopez was represented by both 
attorneys at or near the time the Estrada issue and the psychosexual evaluation occurred, the 
court must address the conduct of both in order to ensure that the issue is properly considered. 
The only specific allegation made by Lopez is that he did not understand that he had the right to 
remain silent prior to completing the psychosexual evaluation and having failed to do so made 
statements upon which the evaluator relied to make the recommendation that Lopez was a 
"moderate risk to re-offend" which impacted the sentence imposed by the court. 
The Estrada rights arise out of Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006), in 
which the Idaho Supreme Court held that the right to counsel attaches to the psychosexual 
evaluation stage of a criminal case. This issue is often raised in post-conviction relief cases with 
the argument that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly advise a defendant as to his 
or her rights under this case authority. In Estrada, the Idaho Supreme Court determined that a 
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defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel as to the decision of whether to submit to a 
psychosexual examination. In addition., the court held that Estrada's counsel was deficient for 
failing to advise the defendant that he had a Fifth Amendment right against self~incrimination 
during the psychosexual examination process. Id, at 564, 839. In Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 
448, 456-57, 224 P.3d 515, 523-24 (Ct. App. 2009) review denied, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
determined that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as it relates to the psychosexual 
evaluation process is satisfied when counsel advises the defendant prior to the examination itself 
and that counsel's presence at the evaluation process was not required. The court determined 
that "[a]s long as appropriate advice is given prior to the examination that comports with 
Estrada, the Sixth Amendment requirement for effective assistance of counsel has been 
satisfied." Id. In addition, the Hughes court that the defendant's Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination as it relates to the effective assistance of counsel is satisfied by the "by virtue 
of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel, which requires that 
counsel inform the client regarding the decision of whether to submit to the PSE and the right to 
assert the privilege against self-incrimination during the PSE." Id, at 460, 527. 
In this case, the Petitioner's Amended Petition states, without specifying which attorney 
is being implicated, that "Petitioner was not informed or understood his 5th Amendment right to 
remain silent prior to completing the psychosexual evaluation." He makes a similar argument in 
his closing memorandum in which he states he did not understand that he had the right to remain 
silent and while he understood that the score of the evaluation would determine what sentence he 
might receive, he did not know that his statements would be used to determine the evaluation of 
the level of his risk to re-offend. 
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At the Evidentiary Hearing in this case, Mr. DeAngelo testified that he discussed the 
psychosexual evaluation (PSE) with Lopez prior to the change of plea because the State's plea 
offer was dependent upon the psychosexual evaluation determination of Lopez' s risk to re-
offend. That is, the State's plea offer involved a staggered sentencing recommendation based on 
the Lopez's participation in the psychosexual evaluation and the determination of the risk to 
reoffend. Mr. DeAngelo testified that he informed Lopez that if he did not participate in the PSE 
then Lopez would not have the benefit of the plea agreement and the court would not have the 
information about Lopez being a threat to the community. He also testified that after taking over 
the case, reviewing the discovery, and discussing a plea agreement with the State, at the April 15, 
2010 jail visit with Lopez, he discussed the plea agreement and the need to participate in the PSE 
along with what possible benefits and risks were associate with participation in the PSE. When 
asked by Lopez's counsel during the Evidentiary Hearing whether he informed Lopez of bis right 
to remain silent, Mr. DeAngelo stated "I did." 
In response to this argument, the State has asked the court to consider the Change of Plea 
hearing transcript and the court has done so. The court finds that Lopez was informed of his 
specific rights pursuant to Estrada as shown by the following: 
Court: I want to advise you that you have certain constitutional rights, fifth and 
sixth amendment rights that continue beyond this date. And that would be the 
right to remain silent or maintain your right against self-incrimination, and the 
right to consult with or have advice of your attorney in the evaluation process that 
will follow this plea up until the time of your sentencing. 
This is basically-we were discussing Estrada rights. It's based upon a 
case that we refer to as the Estrada decision. So if this court orders the 
psychosexual evaluation, which is part of this discussion, is part of the basis of the 
recommendations of sentencing, I want you to understand that you're not required 
to necessarily participate in the psychosexual evaluation and/or to make 
statements that might incriminate you with regard to other criminal offenses or 
may cause your sentence to - perhaps to be treated more harshly or, you know, 
make admissions of aggravation in this case? You understand all of that? 
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Lopez: Yes, Your Honor. 
Court: So if there's participation in the presentence investigation and the 
psychosexual evaluation, you may have rights to remain silent with regard to 
questions asked you during the process. Do you understand that? 
Lopez: Yes, Your Honor. 
(Transcript, April 23, 2010, page 29, 11. 12~25, page 30, 11. 1-17.) 
Court: So Mr. DeAngelo, does your client-is your client going to participate in 
these evaluations? 
Mr. DeAngelo: He's going to participate. We did discuss his right to remain 
silent. We decided that, based on the plea agreement and the possibility for 
sentencing recommendations, and the possibility of his nonparticipation in these 
evaluations and sentencing recommendations, we're going to go ahead and 
participate." 
(Transcript, April 23, 2010, page 31, 1. 25, page 32, 11. 1-8). 
Court: And if, for some reason, you - you understand you're waiving on the 
record here today these Estrada rights that have been discussed with you and 
you've discussed them with your attorney? Do you understand that? 
Lopez: Yes I do, Your Honor. 
(Transcript, April 23, 2010, page 33, 11. 2-7). 
As this shows, the record before this court shows that Lopez was informed of his right to 
remain silent pursuant to bis Estrada rights by his counsel Mr. DeAngelo and by this court. In 
addition, the above recitation shows that Lopez informed the court multiple times that he 
understood that he bad the right to remain silent. In addition, the record shows that Mr. 
DeAngelo represented to the court, and Lopez agreed, that they had discussed the decision 
whether to participate or not in the PSE and bad decided that Lopez would participate in order to 
take advantage of the State's staggered plea offer. Thus, the court finds that Lopez was informed 
of, and represented to the court that he understood, his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights 
associated with participation in a psychosexual evaluation. The court finds that Lopez had 
effective assistance of counsel by Mr. DeAngelo as it relates to this issue. 
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The court does understand through Lopez's testimony that he might have felt intimidated 
by the court system and procedures and may have made statements that he understood his 
Estrada rights when he was really confused about the process. He also testified that he did not 
understand that the opinion of the psychosexual evaluator and the score of the evaluation would 
be taken into consideration along with statements he made during the evaluation process. Lopez 
stated that had he better understood the effect of the PSE that he would have asked more 
questions and remained silent during the evaluation process. The court recognizes and 
understands that the criminal justice system can be overwhelming and confusing, however, this 
court makes every effort to ensure that criminal defendants are both informed and aware of the 
various rights and responsibilities of defendants and lawyers. In this case, as shown above, the 
court explained the rights to Lopez and gave him both an opportunity to consult v.'ith his counsel 
and to ask questions of the court. Lopez was given the opportunity to inquire as to issues he did 
not understand. In addition, as noted above, the Estrada issue arose at the first sentencing date 
and the court continued the hearing to allow Lopez to further consult with Mr. Schwartz prior to 
sentencing. Therefore, the court finds that Lopez was given an adequate opportunity both to 
consult ~ith his attorneys about the Estrada issues, to ask questions of this court, and was given 
additional time to ensure that he fully understood. Lopez informed this court that he understood 
his rights and was making the choice to participate in the PSE. The court finds that Lopez's 
attorneys acted properly in advising Lopez and worked as diligent advocates of Lopez to obtain a 
staggered plea agreement from the State that in all likelihood worked to the benefit of Lopez 
during the sentencing process. 
The court will deny the Petitioner's request for post-conviction relief on the grounds that 
he was not informed of his Estrada rights. The court finds that he benefited from effective 
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assistance of counsel and that he was adequateiy informed by bis counsel and this court of the 
various rights he was entitled to and was choosing to waive. The court finds that Lopez was 
given an adequate opportunity to consult with counsel about the rights and the impact on the plea 
agreement and sentencing. 
Right to Appeal 
In the pro se Petition, Lopez made a statement that "After sentencing my lawyer failed to 
inform me of my right to appeal in writing or any other communication." This assertion was not 
included in the Amended Petition, however, counsel for Lopez raised the issue in direct 
examination of Mr. Schwartz. The court will address the issue, despite the fact that it was not 
raised in the Amended Petition, in order to ensure that all issues are addressed by this court. 
Because the Petitioner did not provide specific argument or authority on the issue, the court is 
left to guess exactly what the claim is because it appears to the court that Lopez concedes that he 
was informed that he had a right to appeal but appears to argue that he didn't know how to go 
about appealing. 
Generally, where a criminal defendant advises his or her attorney of a desire to appeal, 
and the attorney fails to take the necessary steps to file an appeal, such a defendant has been 
denied his or her constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at a critical stage in the 
proceedings. Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356,360, 883 P.2d 714, 718 (Ct. App. 1994). See also, 
Flores v. State, 104 Idaho 191, 657 P .2d 488 (Ct.App.1983). In Beasley, the appellate court held 
that when a defendant requests that an appeal be filed but one is not so filed that the defendant 
has been denied the benefit of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings and that prejudice is 
preswned from the counsel's failure to act in filing the appeal. In Flores, the petitioner claimed 
in an affidavit that he repeatedly asked his attorney to file an appeal and that his attorney agreed 

















to at peruteJrman to discuss did not come see an appeal 
was not allegations were not u-.,i,u."'-' by attorney but ""·"'J'"'"'-1 argued 
defendant and his family, along with counsel determined that an appeal would not be a 
strategically sound decision and thus an appeal was not filed. The court remanded the matter for 
an evidentiary hearing to determine whether there was a specific request to file an appeal that 
was ignored by the attorney. Id, at 491--492, 194-195. In Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933, 936, 
120 P.3d 751, 754 (Ct. App. 2005), the appellate court upheld dismissal of a post-conviction 
claim related to counsel's failure to file an appeal because Loveland declined to present any 
evidence that his counsel ignored bis request to file a direct appeal. Recently in Willie v. State, 
149 Idaho 647,649,239 P.3d 445,447 (Ct. App. 2010), the court found that when the petitioner 
failed to present any evidence at the hearing to support his claim that trial counsel failed to 
inform him about his right to appeal, that the district court was correct in denying the request for 
post-conviction relief. 
At the Evidentiary Hearing, when asked Mr. Schwartz testified that he did not have any 
independent recollection of discussing the opportunity to appeal with Lopez. He testified that it 
was his normal practice to discuss the issue of appeals during the pre-sentencing conference with 
the defendant. He also testified that he knew that this court would always present the 
information to a defendant, and would require him to do the same at the time of sentencing. He 
testified that it was his practice to file a Notice of Appeal when requested to do so by a defendant 
either orally, by letter, or by telephone call. Mr. Schwartz could not recall if Lopez requested an 
appeal and that if Lopez had sent a letter requesting an appeal that such letter should be in the 
file. During his testimony, Lopez testified that he was informed of his right to appeal at the time 
of sentencing but was not informed by Mr. Schwartz about the process of filing an appeal and 
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was not sure how to proceed with that process. He stated at the Evidentiary Hearing "I may not 
have understood it all, I knew the option was there." This statement informs the court that 
Lopez's issue is not a lack of awareness of the right to appeal but an apparent confusion about 
how to go about the process. 
The sentencing transcript shows that at the conclusion of the hearing, the court provided 
the defendant with a Notice to Defendant Upon Sentencing which is a document that sets forth 
the defendant's rights on appeal. Tue court provided Lopez the opportunity to consult with Mr. 
Schwartz about it and then further explained to Lopez that he had the right to appeal, had the 
right to an attorney on appeal including the right to a public defender. Lopez informed the court 
at that time that he understood his rights and had the opportunity to consult with Mr. Schwartz. 
(Transcript, July 13, 2010, page 42). 
Tue court, in this case, is left with a bit of a quandary as to this issue because Petitioner 
raises the issue but fails to address it in argument and fails to support the issue with any 
authority, leaving the court unclear as to the Petitioner's allegation. In addition, the record is 
bconsistent in that Lopez seems to argue both that he was not told of his right to appeal while 
recognizing in this testimony that he was told, but didn't understand the process. Finally, Lopez 
a'sserts that he sent Mr. Schwartz a letter requesting an appeal but neither he, nor Mr. Schwartz 
have the letter or at the least, presented it as evidence to the court. 
Tnerefore, the court, while recognizing that Lopez has the right to appeal and has the 
right to have an attorney file an appeal on his behalf, finds that Lopez has failed to present by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he actually did make a request that Mr. Schwartz file an 
appeal on his behalf. The court is not in the position of speculating and it is the Petitioner's 
burden to ensure th.at evidence is in the record to support his claims. The Evidentiary Hearing 











was the time set forth for the presentation of evidence and the court cannot find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Lopez requested an appeal be filed on his behalf. The court 
will not grant post-conviction relief on this issue. 
Conclusion and Order 
For the reasons set forth above, the Petitioner Damon Marcelino Lopez's Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief is denied. A separate judgment shall be prepared and filed by the court in 
compliance with I.R.C.P. 54(a). 
r 
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